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Abstract: Despite their geographical proximity, common history, and joint experience with social
segmentation, there is a surprising dearth of studies systematically comparing consociationalism in
Belgium and the Netherlands. This paper aims to help fill that lacuna by discussing the similarities
and differences between the two countries in this respect. The similarities range from the time
period of consociationalism, the original cleavage structure, to the existence of cross-pressures at
the organizational level. The most important difference is that geography always played a bigger
role in Belgium. This was true even before the politicization of the language divide, but it also
explains why Belgium entered a new phase of consociationalism after depillarization and the
Netherlands did not. Both countries currently face challenges by anti-establishment parties against
the elite cartel, which raises questions whether this is not inherent to consociationalism once the
original social segmentation has eroded.
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‘At first sight, so many centrifugal forces appear to be at work in Belgium, that her existence as
a political unit seems paradoxical’ (J.A. Goris, cited in Huyse 1970: 222-223)
‘Theoretically your country cannot exist’ (R.A. Dahl on the Netherlands, cited in Daalder 1989: 26)
An Obvious but Rare Comparison
Together with the ‘high’ countries of Austria and Switzerland, the ‘Low Countries’ –
Belgium and the Netherlands - are seen as the four classic cases of consociational
democracy in Europe (e.g. Lijphart 1977: 25-103; McRae 1974: 13): deeply divided
societies in which the centrifugal forces were contained by political accommodation at the
elite level. That both the Low Countries exist at all is a miracle if the two quotes on top
of this article are to be believed. In view of the proximity of the two countries, their
partially shared history, and the fact that a common language facilitates easy
communication between Dutch and Flemish scholars (the study of Belgian
conscociationalism has been a predominantly Flemish enterprise, but see for literature in
French for example Piron and Verjans 2014; Seiler 1997), it is surprising that there are so
few attempts at systematically comparing these two cases of consociationalism. In 1983,
the first and so far only ‘Belgian-Dutch Scholarly Meeting on Consociationalism’ was held
at Louvain, but the resulting special issue of Acta Politica (Van Schendelen 1984a),
contains no comparative papers apart from a brief report on the meeting’s discussions
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(Huyse 1984: 159-160). The special issue includes a bibliography (161-175), indicating with
one or two asterisks whether an entry reports on Dutch or on Belgium consociationalism:
no entry has three asterisks! The occasional monograph on the politics of the Low
Countries (e.g. Erk et al 2013; Weil 1970) deals with them separately, in sections or even
chapters devoted to either country. There have been a few exceptions, dealing with aspects
such as pillarization (e.g. Hellemans 1988; Post 1989; Wintle 2000), corporatism (e.g.
Hemerijck and Visser 2000), the impact of Europeanization on consociationalism
(Vollaard et al. 2015), or consociationalism as such (Keman 2008). This paper seeks to
contribute to filling this lacuna by systematically comparing the Belgian and Dutch
experiences with consociationalism.
In doing so, I shall focus on three aspects. Given the definition of consociationalism as
social segmentation (the problem) combined with political accommodation (the solution),
these two characteristics will be addressed first. Both the degree of segmentation
(coinciding or cross-cutting social cleavages) and the nature of the cleavages (ideological or
ethnic/linguistic) have been discussed in the literature as potentially affecting the
seriousness of the threat to political stability (e.g. Barry 1975; Van Schendelen 1984b).
Lijphart’s four characteristics of elite accommodation (grand coalition, proportionality,
segmental autonomy and mutual veto) are generally accepted, but there has been some
debate about the level to which they apply: the level of political systems, as Lijphart
advocates, or that of individual issues or arenas (Halpern 1986: 192-193; Steiner 1981:
348). A third issue is the trajectory that Dutch and Belgian consociationalism have taken
since the original social divisions have eroded. Originally, Lijphart warned against
continued elite cooperation without segmentation (e.g. Lijphart 1968), but he changed his
mind in later publications (e.g. Lijphart 2001).
The Same Problem?
The Nature of the Social Cleavages
With Luxembourg, the Low Countries were part of the Habsburg Empire as the Union of
the Seventeen Provinces until well into the 16th century. During the Eighty Years War
(1568-1648), the Northern provinces gained independence as the Republic of the Seven
United Provinces – now the Kingdom of the Netherlands, leaving the Southern provinces
under Habsburg, Napoleonic, and briefly even Dutch,1 rule until achieving independence
as the Kingdom of Belgium in 1830. The outcome of the Eighty Years War, concluded in
the Treaty of Westphalia, turned both Low Countries into deeply divided polities. Had the
border between the two countries coincided with the basin of the Rhine and Meuse rivers,
the Netherlands would largely have been religiously homogeneous (i.e. Calvinist
Protestant). And had the border coincided with the ancient Roman highway from Aachen
in Germany to Bavai in Northern France, Belgium would have been linguistically
homogeneous (i.e. francophone). But instead of the border between Rome and
Reformation, or the border between Roman and Germanic languages, the exploits of the
Dutch war of independence put the political border somewhere in between the two
‘natural’ borders, eventually creating two segmented countries (Andeweg and Irwin 2014:
5-9).
1 Formally, the Southern Netherlands did not come under Dutch rule, but it was perceived as such by many
Belgian elites
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However, this reading of the origins and nature of the segmentation in both countries is
misleading for our purpose. First, the now dominant linguistic cleavage in Belgium has
been slow to emerge. Well into the 20th century, French remained the language of the
elites in both Wallonia and Flanders. When, after the Napoleonic period, the Congress of
Vienna reunited the two Low Countries as a Kingdom under the Dutch William of
Orange, the Belgian elites, and not just the Walloon elites, felt oppressed by the
dominance of Dutch as the language of politics (among other things), and the union lasted
only 15 years. Apart from a ‘Flemish movement’ in the 19th century, the language division
became truly politicized only after the First World War, in which Flemish soldiers had
been asked to fight for a state that communicated with them in a language that most of
them did not understand. Even then, the linguistic cleavage only came into ascendancy as
the other social cleavages eroded.
Second, despite the absence of a sizeable Protestant denomination, religion did
constitute a social cleavage in Belgium, but it was between Roman Catholics who were
loyal to the clergy on the one hand and more secular Liberals and Socialists on the other.
And third, despite the existence of both Roman Catholics and two main varieties of
Protestantism in the Netherlands, the religious cleavage was not so much between these
denominations, as they mostly set their differences aside to present a united front against
Liberals and Socialists, at least on matters related to religion (education, the suffrage,
more recently abortion and euthanasia). This ‘antithesis’ distinguished, in the words of the
Dutch Protestant leader Abraham Kuyper, those who believed in divine sovereignty from
those who believed in popular sovereignty - much the same situation as in Belgium. And
in both countries it was the issue of education (the freedom to set up religious schools and
have them financed by the state) that galvanized the camps on either side of this divide.
Finally, the social class cleavage divided both countries since industrialization. In Belgium
this process started soon after independence and was initially concentrated primarily in the
Walloon part of the country. The Netherlands remained a largely agricultural society until
at least the First World War, which meant that many who came to work in Dutch mines
and factories had already been mobilized by Christian Democratic parties and trade
unions before Socialist organizations emerged. But other than these consequences of
differential timing, the cleavages that gave rise to segmentation were similar in the two
Low Countries, depriving us of an opportunity to compare the accommodation of
different types of cleavages.
Coinciding or Crosscutting Cleavages
Around these social cleavages networks of organizations developed in both countries for
education, housing, health care, sports, media, interest representation (for example trade
unions), politics, etc., effectively locking the rank and file into tight subcultures and
insulating them from outside influences. The term ‘verzuiling’ in Dutch, ‘pillarization’ in
English, was first employed by Dutch sociologists (e.g. Kruyt 1950), and is used in both
countries to describe these conglomerates of subcultural organizations (in francophone
Belgium the term ‘familles spirituelles’ was used). For Lijphart, first in his analysis of the
Netherlands (Lijphart 1975), and later in his comparative work (e.g. Lijphart 1977),
pillarization poses a threat to democratic stability. After all, democratic theory at that
time argued that in case of cross-cutting cleavages, individuals are in contact with fellow
citizens on the other side of cleavages, and these ‘cross-pressures’ supposedly have a
moderating effect. The very fact that pillarization severely limits cross-cleavage contacts
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removes this moderating effect. In Lijphart’s account, when the pillar elites realized the
risk of escalation of conflicts between the subcultures, they consciously designed an
alternative to cross-pressures at the mass level: the cooperation at the elite level that
constitutes the core of consociational democracy. Both the equation of pillarization with
coinciding cleavages, and the realization of the risks by prudent elites, prompting them to
cooperate (Lijphart’s first ‘self-denying prophecy’) have been criticized by scholars in both
Low Countries.
In his literature review that is considered one of the founding texts of consociational
studies in Belgium, Huyse (1970), for example, argues that Dutch and Belgian pillarization
were different. In Belgium, he suggests, there may not have been cross-pressures at the
individual level, but they existed at the organizational level (also see Lorwin 1966).
Socialist organizations, for example, defended both working class interests and secularism,
and often had to weigh these two causes against each other. For the first, it would be
logical to team up not only with the Liberal trade union, but also with the Christian
labour union, but for the second, a coalition with Liberal rather than Christian
organizations would be called for. The Liberals faced a similar dilemma. The situation was
different for the Christian pillar, but they had to reconcile diverging socio-economic
interests within their own network. Such organizational cross-pressures forced the pillars
to moderate their positions. According to Huyse, consociationalism was called for mostly
when issues that did not fit the cleavage structure arose, as such issues could not profit
from the moderating forces mentioned above.
Huyse makes a valid point, but the same logic can also be applied to Dutch
pillarization, where Socialists and Liberals had to make similar strategic choices, and
where the Christian-Democrats also had to deal with class conflicts internally. The fact
that in both countries there has been a cross-cutting cleavage at the mass level for
Christian Democrats is already significant, but theoretically more important is the notion
that the existence of more than one cleavage can have a moderating effect at the
organizational level, as has likely been the case for the Socialists and Liberals in both the
Low Countries. It reinforces the position of those who doubt that elite accommodation
has been a reaction by prudent leaders to the threat of political instability caused by social
segmentation.
The Sequence of Social Segmentation and Political Accommodation
Indeed, it has been called into question whether pillarization has ever posed a threat to
democratic stability in the Netherlands. Most organizations that made up the Dutch
pillars were created not before, but after the Great Pacification of 1917, the supposed
starting point of a practice of elite accommodation. Deschouwer (1999: 76) comes to the
same conclusion for Belgium: ‘(. . .) it is only after the initial accommodative agreement
that the real institutionalization, or pillarization, of the subcultures took off’. With regard
to the Low Countries at least, Lijphart seems to have found a solution for a problem that
did not yet exist. According to Daalder (1966, 1989), elite accommodation was not so
much the reaction of responsible elites to any acute threat, but rather the continuation of
the elite culture of the confederal Dutch Republic of the Seven United Provinces. The
pillars replaced the provinces, but an emphasis on autonomy for the constituent parts, and
on bargaining and compromise to resolve differences between these parts has remained.
The very term ‘consociationalism’ was introduced by the German scholar Althusius in his
contemporary account of politics in the Dutch Republic. And it is interesting that the
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starting point of this new variety of old elite practices is called ‘the Great Pacification’,
harking back to the Pacification of Ghent (1576), when the (then 17) provinces agreed to
respect their religious differences and form a united front against the religious and
administrative oppression by Spanish Habsburg. In fact, we might go back even further in
Dutch history: elite accommodation, particularly in the socio-economic domain, is also
known as ‘the polder model’ in the Netherlands, evoking an association with the ‘water
control boards’ (waterschappen), dating back to the 14th century, in which farmers did not
compete, but cooperated to build and maintain the dikes that prevented all of them from
being flooded.
However, this very different account of the link between consociationalism and
pillarization is also not without weaknesses. It is undoubtedly true that pillarization
accelerated only after the start of consociationalism in the Netherlands, but if we use a
subcultural rather than an organizational definition of pillarization, the social
segmentation was clearly visible before 1917. Deschouwer, having pointed out that
pillarized organizations sprang up after the start of elite accommodation in Belgium, adds
that Belgian accommodation still was a reaction to existing or potential conflict – a
watered down version of Lijphart’s self-denying prophecy.
Differential Pillarization
Even if the nature of the cleavage structure and segmentation, and the level of threat it
posed to stability, may not have been very different in the two Low Countries, there have
been significant differences. First, pillarization appears to have been relatively more
institutionalized in the Netherlands. Wintle (2000: 147) comments on the closed, inward
looking nature of the Dutch pillars compared to those in Belgium, which he attributes to
the more emancipationist nature of the Dutch pillars. In Belgium, pillarization was, in
Huyse’s words, unfinished and unstable, vulnerable to new ‘open’ conflicts (Huyse 1970:
198-222). An important reason is the regional aspect of pillarization in Belgium. Given the
different timing of industrialization in the North and South of Belgium, the Christian
pillar was particularly strong and well-developed in Flanders, but had a much weaker and
more loosely structured organization on the other side of the language border. For the
Socialists this was the other way around. The fact that the Christian and the Socialist
pillars had their strongholds in different parts of the country also meant that the language
cleavage was not completely unrepresented in Belgian politics, even if its representation
was indirect and informal. In the Netherlands, such a regional dimension is virtually
absent: Catholics dominated the southern provinces of North Brabant and Limburg, but
by the time pillarization developed many Catholics also lived in the provinces to the
North. Similarly, orthodox Calvinism is particularly strong in a ‘Bible belt’ from the
South-West to the East of the Netherlands, but that religion is by no means confined to
that area.
There is one exception to the more complete pillarization of the social segments in the
Netherlands. In both the Low Countries, the Liberal ‘pillar’ was weaker than its Christian
and Socialist counterparts, but for the Netherlands the Liberals do not really qualify as a
pillar. In the Netherlands Catholics, Protestants and Socialists build their organizational
networks as part of a movement of emancipation against Liberal dominance. The Liberals
never felt a similar urge to organize themselves, and they formed a residual category rather
than a full-blown pillar; in Wintle’s (2000: 142) aptly chosen words: ‘it tended to be the
place where those who could not be accommodated in the Calvinist, Catholic or Socialist
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pillars ended up, and in that sense might even be referred to as a pile or a heap rather
than as a pillar’. In Belgium, by contrast, the Liberal pillar was still well organized, with
formalized links between the Liberal party and other Liberal organizations (Deschouwer
1999: 86).
Similar Solution?
Pacification Equals Passification?
In both the Low Countries, elite accommodation of religious and class divisions can be
observed from the end of the First World War to halfway through the 1960s. As
mentioned above, Dutch consociationalism started with ‘the Great Pacification’ of 1917, a
package deal that resolved the ‘school struggle’ (schoolstrijd) by granting the public
financing of religious schools on an equal footing with the state schools, the conflict over
universal suffrage by extending the franchise to all adult males, and introduced
proportional representation, which ensured the political survival of the Liberals after the
abolition of the regime censitaire. The starting point of Belgian consociationalism is
generally regarded to be the 1918 ‘Pact of Loppem’, an agreement between Catholic,
Socialist, and Liberal politicians following negotiations chaired by King Albert I in a
castle in West-Flanders (e.g. Gerard 2006: 887-895). The pact introduced universal and
single male suffrage (a system of universal male suffrage in which some men had more
votes had already been adopted in 1893), introduced measures towards equality for
languages and trade unions, and led to a government in which all three pillar-parties were
represented (the Delacroix I government).
There is also similarity in the ‘rules of the game’ that governed elite accommodation in
both countries. Lijphart has famously listed a grand coalition, proportionality, segmental
autonomy, and mutual veto as the four characteristics of consociationalism (Lijphart 1977:
25-47), and they can be found in Belgium and in the Netherlands. However, the list is
longer, and slightly different in Lijphart’s original analysis of Dutch consociationalist
practices: a businesslike approach to politics; depoliticization of controversial issues; the
government’s right to govern with little interference from Parliament; secrecy, summit
diplomacy; an agreement to disagree, and proportionality (Lijphart 1975). Many of these
practices point to a top-down approach to politics. Consociationalism is cooperation
rather than competition among the elites, and to cooperate successfully in a deeply divided
society, the leaders of the various pillars needed some protection against the more radical
elements of their own rank and file. Hence the importance of secrecy, and of a government
somewhat aloof from daily political conflicts. The other side of this coin is that the rank
and file allow their leaders sufficient room for maneuver: in his history of the Low
Countries, Kossmann observed that ‘the whole system depended on the political passivity
of the people. Had the Catholic, Protestant, or Socialist masses insisted on their leaders
fully implementing their doctrines and the principles on which verzuiling was based, there
would not have been much room for the prevailing policy of compromise and cooperation’
(Kossmann 1978: 574). Daalder (1964) has discussed Dutch consociational practices under
the heading of ‘leadership and apathy’ (‘leiding en lijdelijkheid’), and Huyse (1970) more or
less stumbled upon consociationalism when he looked for an explanation for the ‘passivity’
of Belgian citizens. Hence his title ‘passiviteit, pacificatie en verzuiling’ (apathy, pacification
and pillarization). Pappalardo (1981: 380-382) lists ‘elite predominance over a politically
deferential and organizationally encapsulated following’ as one of only two conditions that
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can be regarded unambiguously as favourable to successful consociationalism.
Nevertheless, its relevance seems somewhat understated in more comparative and
theoretical accounts of consociationalism.
Structural Versus Intermittent Consociationalism
However, this is where the similarities between the two Low Countries end. The most
important difference is that consociationalism has never been completely accepted in
Belgium. This already applies to the very first agreement: what was the ‘Pact of Loppem’
for some was called the ‘Coup de Loppem’ by others. Moreover, this pact was only the
first of several such agreements: ‘(. . .) in Belgium’, writes Deschouwer (1999: 79),
‘consociational structures and techniques have been adopted in waves. They were used to
pacify only one problem at a time, leaving other cleavages subject to more competitive
strategies of decision-making’, that is, until those strategies produced another crisis.
Consociationalism was not only used intermittently, but it also seems to have been used by
a particular set of actors. In parliament, and to a lesser degree also in government, politics
remained a competitive game, but whenever that game led to deadlock and crisis, not
ministers or leading MPs, but the parties’ presidents retired to one of Belgium’s many
chateaux to practice a more consociational style (e.g. De Winter et al 2000: 328). In the
Netherlands, by contrast, elite cooperation seems to be a more structural aspect of
political decision making. The ‘Great Pacification of 1917’ has been the only such pact,
setting the tone for continuous consensus-seeking afterward. This difference between the
two countries implies that Steiner’s (1981) suggestion that consociationalism should be
studied at the level of individual decisions rather than countries is particularly pertinent
for Belgium, but less so for the Netherlands. It also means that the interpretation of elite
accommodation as a prudent reaction to a threat to political stability finds more support
in the Belgian than in the Dutch case.
What can explain this ‘consociationalism-in-waves’ in Belgium in contrast to
‘consociationalism-as-a-daily-practice’ in the Netherlands (also see Wintle 2000: 148-149)?
Huyse (1970: 233) suggests that the Belgian parliament was a less suitable arena for
national elite accommodation, because it is elected in multi-member districts, giving it a
more regional than national focus. This implies that the daily practice of politics is not in
the hands of consociationalists, and one could hardly keep the party chairs confined to a
castle permanently. Second, we already discussed the less complete and less stable nature
of the Belgian pillars, and this may also have been a factor making Belgian politics less
predictable.
A third explanation would be the permanent temptation of majoritarian politics in
Belgium: ‘It is as if governments which perceived themselves as ‘strong’ tried to gain
decisive advantages without much concern for consociationalism. Consociationalism
reappears, however, when conflicts become so deep that they might destroy the political
system and none of the conflicting actors is able to overcome his adversaries. The
agreements are more the result of a stalemate than of a permanent spirit of compromise’
(Frognier 1988a, also see Frognier 1988b). This is related to the nature of Belgian
pillarization mentioned above: the notion that each segment forms a minority is more
difficult to keep alive when one segment is dominant in Wallonia, and another segment is
dominant in Flanders. This became most visible in the 1950s. A conflict arose over the
return of King Leopold III after the Second World War. The King had stayed in Belgium
during the Nazi occupation, and was accused of rather too cozy relations with the
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occupation forces. Eventually, it was decided to put the ‘Royal question’ to the people in a
referendum in 1950. There is a bit of a debate whether the referendum is a majoritarian or
a consociational device. In Switzerland, the risk that a referendum might be called has
been argued to make the parties all the more determined to find a compromise that is
acceptable to all, thus preempting any party from mobilizing support for a referendum. In
Belgium, however, the referendum had a very different effect. There was an overall
majority in favour of the King’s return, but in Wallonia and in Brussels there was a
majority against. Violence broke out, three people were actually killed, and the King had
to be persuaded, in spite of the referendum outcome, to abdicate in favour of his son
Baudouin in 1951 (e.g. Deschouwer 2012: 38). This referendum also took place in a period
(late 1940s and 1950s) in which both Christians and Socialists pursued majoritarian
strategies. In 1950, the Christian party even obtained a parliamentary majority and formed
a single-party government. Why the majoritarian temptation has been stronger in Belgium
than in the Netherlands is not clear. Other than in Belgium, no political party ever
commanded an overall majority in the Dutch parliament, but that cannot be the whole
explanation. The three main Christian parties in the Netherlands (the Catholic KVP and
the Protestant ARP and CHU) together had a parliamentary majority for the entire period
of consociationalism (i.e. until 1967), and we already mentioned that they considered their
differences as less important than their joint position on the religious dimension – in 1980
the three parties formally merged into the CDA. Yet, they have never seriously considered
forming an exclusively Christian government when this was numerically possible. Perhaps
they refrained from using their joint majority to avoid a backlash in the longer run against
the concessions they had received (such as state support for their schools), but that merely
begs the question why the Belgian Christian party did not fear a similar backlash when it
formed a single-party government.
A further potential explanation is the fact that, in the Netherlands, all pillars shared a
strong national identity. Even although the two solidly Catholic provinces in the South
had been denied full provincial status during the Republic, and although there is some
resentment there against the ‘Hollanders’ (i.e. the people in the dominant province of
Holland, currently the provinces of North and South Holland), this never weakened the
legitimacy of the polity. In the Northern province of Frysla^n, the Frisian language is
officially recognized, and a Frisian Nationalist Party does exist, but here too, being part
of the Netherlands is not called into question. Originally, the situation was similar in
Belgium, with a partial exception for the region around the city of Liege, which was a
separate episcopal principality, and the short-lived joint Kingdom with the Netherlands
(1850-1830) did much to reinforce a common Belgian identity. It was only in the early
20th century, and only in Flanders, that a ‘Flemish national consciousness has
progressively taken precedence over Belgian national feeling’ (Stengers 1981: 57). As De
Schryver put it in the same edited volume: ‘(. . .) in 1830 all the inhabitants proudly
called themselves Belgians, even while speaking various languages. Later (. . .) “Belgian”
became a family name, and “Fleming” or “Walloon” were added as given names. After
World War II, the nomenclature was reversed. “Fleming” and “Walloon” gradually
became last names, but all Belgians continued to bear the same Christian name, for that
was the name of their common forefather one hundred and fifty years ago. The future
will tell if new generations will bear the name “Belgian” as a first, second, or perhaps
just a third name – a mere souvenir of historical consciousness’ (De Schryver 1981: 31-
32).
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Similar Trajectories?
The Pace of Depillarization
From the 1960s, when the first signs of depillarization became visible in both the Low
Countries, the trajectories have also been different. In both countries, religion and
ideology had provided the glue that kept the pillarized networks intact. With ‘the end of
ideology’ (and with secularization first) these networks started to disintegrate in the
Netherlands (e.g. Andeweg and Irwin 2014: 46-49). However this erosion was much slower
in Belgium because the pillars had also developed into service-providing organizations and
clientelistic networks (e.g. Deschouwer 1999: 88). Whether by historical accident or by
design, with the extension of the welfare state, the Belgian pillars also extended their
reach. As an illustrative example: while the state distributes unemployment benefits in the
Netherlands, the pillarized trade unions do so in Belgium (Deschouwer 2012: 211). Health
insurance provides another illustration, as Belgian citizens have to join one of the
pillarized health insurance organizations (mutualite) which reimburses them for the costs
of health care (Deschouwer 2012: 210). In the Netherlands health insurance is provided by
commercial organizations. Providing such services likely has slowed down the decline in
membership of the parties and their auxiliary organizations in Belgium, at least in
comparison to the Dutch case.
Party membership started to decline in the Netherlands with the onset of depillarization
(i.e. well before the first point of measurement in Table 1), whereas in Belgium it was not
until the 1990s that political parties saw a drop in membership figures. With trade union
density rates the contrast is even sharper: Table 2 shows declining membership in the
Netherlands and actual increases in membership in Belgium.
Table 2: Trade Union Membership as a Percentage of the Workforce in Belgium and the
Netherlands
Belgium Netherlands
1970 42.3 36.0
1980 56.6 32.4
1990 56.7 22.3
1995a 59.8 23.0
a1996 for the Netherlands
Source: Scruggs (2002: 277, Table 1).
Table 1: Party Membership as a Percentage of the Electorate in Belgium and the Netherlands
Belgium Netherlands
1980 8.97 4.29
1989 9.15 3.19
1999 6.55 2.51
2008 5.52 2.48
Source: Van Biezen et al. (2012, Appendix Table 1).
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The End of Consociationalism Versus Consociationalism 2.0
By far the most important difference between the two countries is not the pace of
depillarization, but the fact that depillarization marked a (so far) permanent dealignment
in the Netherlands, whereas in Belgium dealignment along the class and religious cleavages
merely paved the way for a realignment along the language cleavage. In the Netherlands
there has been speculation about realignment along the materialism/postmaterialism
distinction, and more recently along the divide between multiculturalists and
monoculturalists. Both issues, and particularly the latter one are important ideological
dimensions, and some parties have sought to mobilize voters on the basis of these issues,
e.g. D66 and the Green Left on postmaterialism, and Wilders’ Party of Freedom on
monoculturalism, but they have not developed into political cleavages comparable to class
and religion before the 1960s (Andeweg and Irwin 2014: 49-54). As a consequence, the
Netherlands can no longer be classified as a consociationalist country. Yet, elite
cooperation, at least between the established parties, continues, whether as a result of path
dependency, or because cooperation is necessitated by the absence of a majority party.
Thus the Netherlands post pillarization is best classified as a depoliticized democracy.
In Belgium, the language cleavage has always been there, gradually becoming more
salient during the 20th century, waiting to be territorialized and politicized. The Dutch
speaking majority was motivated by the historical injustices against their language: after
independence French had been adopted as the only official language, and the recognition
of the Dutch language had to be conquered in various domains, not least university
education. The French speaking minority sought protection against the Dutch speaking
majority, especially when economic power shifted in the second half of the 20th century
from Wallonia, with its now outdated heavy industry, to Flanders, with the port of
Antwerp and its petrochemical industries, and its modern service-based economy. The
fears were opposite in the Brussels agglomeration: originally a Flemish city, it has become
a predominantly francophone enclave in Flanders, with the towns and villages around
Brussels gradually being frenchified: the ‘Brussels oil stain’. French speakers emphasized
the right to speak their own language, and Dutch speakers feared the French speaking
majority. The various positions were first given voice by regionalist parties: for the French
speakers the Rassemblement Wallon (1965) in Wallonia, and the Front Democratique des
Francophones (1968) in the Brussels area, and for the Dutch speakers the Volksunie (1954).
These parties were electorally successful, especially in the 1970s, and participated in
government. However, the established parties took some of the wind out of their sails
when each of these parties split into a Dutch speaking and a French speaking party: the
Christian party first (1968) and the Socialist party last (1978). New challengers, such as the
Greens, also followed the example of having separate parties for the Dutch speaking and
French speaking parts of the country. Each of the new parties only presents lists of
candidates in electoral districts within its own region (and in Brussels). This political split
provided a powerful impetus for the constitutional federalization of the country – the
main item on the political agenda since the 1970s (e.g. Pilet et al. 2009).
Consociationalism entered a new phase in Belgium, and the old practices of elite
accommodation were now used to deal with the linguistic tensions. As in the first phase,
consociationalism is not a daily practice, but it surfaces at intervals. At the time of
writing, the official reading (e.g.: https://www.vlaamsparlement.be/over-het-vlaams-parleme
nt/geschiedenis/samenvatting-zes-staatshervormingen-een-handig-schema) has it that there
have been six pacts to restructure the state (1970; 1980; 1988; 1993; 2001/2003; and 2011/
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2012), but some of these package deals are made up of several consecutive agreements.
The 2001/2003 state reform, for example, actually consists of three agreements: the
Hermes-, Lambermont-, and Lombard-pacts. Moreover, the 1977 Egmont pact is not
counted as one of the six because it was not implemented in the face of Flemish resistance.
And the 1963 agreement to freeze the language border is regarded as a precursor and
should perhaps be added to this list.
The four characteristics of consociationalism are easily recognized in what has emerged
from these pacts, with a particularly strong emphasis on segmental autonomy. There are
three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), and three (cultural) communities (Dutch
speaking, French speaking, and German speaking), each with their own parliament and
government, although matters are simplified somewhat because the Flemish have all but
merged their region and community into a single institutional framework. Step by step, the
Belgian national centre has been almost emptied of content by devolution to these regions
and communities. The 1993 Saint Michael’s Agreement formally turned Belgium into a
federal state. However, because of the splitting of the political parties, the federal level has
no autonomous role – it is not an actor in itself but a mere arena: in practice Belgium is
more a confederation than a federation. Thus, consociational decision-making is primarily
found at the federal level, and in Brussels. The requirement of government by grand
coalition takes the form of rules that there must be parity between the two main language
groups in government (with the exception of the Prime Minister), and that for some
legislation a majority of MPs in both language groups is needed. An ‘alarm bell
procedure’ provides for a mutual veto: if, before the final vote on a bill, at least three
quarters of the MPs from a language group support a motion that the bill harms the
interests of their language group, the vote is suspended, and the government (with its
parity of ministers from the language groups) has 30 days to find a solution. These
consociational rules were put in place in 1970 for the federal level, and in 1988 for the
bilingual Brussels region. So far, the alarm bell procedure has been instigated twice at the
federal level. Proportionality, of paramount importance in the past, probably is the least
important of the four consociational characteristics in the current version of
consociationalism. Proportional respresentation, almost a Belgian invention after all,
remains in use as the electoral system at all levels, but with only two sides in the language
conflict (the German minority is too small to play a role of its own), the Flemish camp
will have a majority at the national level, and the francophones will have a majority in the
Brussels region, even under proportionality. In that situation, parity is much more
important than proportionality.
These consociational characteristics of the Belgian federation turn Belgium into what
Deschouwer (e.g. 2005) has aptly labelled a case of ‘consociational federalism’. It is this
second episode of Belgian consociationalism that was lauded by Lijphart (1981: 1):
‘Belgium can legitimately claim to be the most thorough example of consociational
democracy’; ‘it provides a complete empirical example of the consociational alternative to
majoritarian democracy’ (Lijphart 1981: 8; also see Seiler 1997). Others, however, have
also pointed to the tensions that are inherent to this combination of federalism and
consociationalism (e.g. Piron and Verjans 2014; Sinardet 2011). Lijphart was still
optimistic about the future of Belgian consociationalism: writing after only two of the six
state reforms, he argued that ‘there are good reasons to think that consociationalism will
remain successful in the long run’ (Lijphart 1981: 10). To a large extent Lijphart’s
optimism has proven warranted: the elites have continued to resolve crises between the
two language communities, and Belgium still exists! However, keeping the country
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together has become increasingly difficult. To coordinate all the governments in Belgium
(federal, Flemish, Walloon region, French community, Brussels, German community) a
Concertation Committee is provided for, but in practice it falls to the governments
themselves. Such inter-governmental coordination is easiest if the governing coalitions at
all levels are congruent and symmetrical, for example if the coalitions in all regions and
communities are made up of the Christian and Socialist parties at that level, and if the
federal coalition then includes both the Flemish and francophone Christian and Socialist
parties. Given the different political landscapes in Flanders and Wallonia this is already
very difficult (a given combination of parties that has a majority in Wallonia may not
have a majority in Flanders, etc.), but after the decoupling of the elections in 2003,
elections held at different moments further diminish the chances that congruent and
symmetrical coalitions can be formed. In 2017, for example, the Liberal MR was the only
francophone party in the federal government and all six governments were differently
composed. The Walloon region, for example, was governed by Christians and Liberals,
but the francophone community by Christians and Socialists.
Even more problematic is that, due to the language split in the party system, electoral
competition takes place only within Flanders and within Wallonia. At that level the parties
(and the Flemish parties in particular) campaign with promises to get more powers
transferred from the federal to the regional government. This turns federalization into a
never-ending project, but at this stage there is not much left anymore to be transferred
(e.g. Caluwaerts and Reuchamps 2015; Deschouwer 2005). This leaves splitting the country
as the only logical end state, and the largest Flemish party, the regionalist N-VA
(successor to the Volksunie) is already committed to that goal. However, given the
problem of the capital Brussels – a largely French speaking enclave in Flanders, splitting
the country is easier said than done.
The Vulnerability of Depoliticized Democracy
Such an existential threat to the polity is completely absent in the Netherlands, but both
the Low Countries share another challenge that is intricately linked to consociationalism
itself. The essence of consociationalism is the replacement, in a divided country, of
competition at the elite level with political cooperation. This effectively deprives the
citizens of a meaningful choice between political parties, as the parties will cooperate after
the elections anyway. As long as there is a clear need for this cooperation, that is: as long
as society is deeply divided, the absence of choice is not acutely felt. After all, a secular
working class voter would not seriously consider voting for a Catholic party anyway, etc.
But as soon as the cleavages had eroded and depillarization was well on its way, the
absence of choice became more than a problem for democratic theory. Writing in 2008,
Keman argues that with some delay, depillarization led to more competitive elite
behaviour: ‘Instead of coalescence as the main pattern of political behaviour, the name of
the game appeared to be developing into political confrontation at elections, leading to
change in the party system and within government’ (Keman 2008: 208). While the evidence
he cites in support of this conclusion is uncontested (rising electoral volatility, the
emergence of new parties, changes in the composition of governing coalitions, and the
ascendancy of new political issues such as immigration, welfare retrenchment and
European integration), this does not automatically imply of a shift from accommodation
to confrontation. In both the Low Countries, an increase in electoral volatility signaled
that voters started to choose, but the political elites continued to cooperate, if only
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because the changes did not affect the minority status of all parties. Consociationalism
only ended because one part of the definition – social segmentation – disappeared, not
because elite accommodation stopped. Even worse: with depillarization also came a de-
ideologization, which considerably reduced the differences between the established pillar-
parties. As Koole and Daalder observed for the Netherlands: ‘the present atmosphere
differs from that of the days of pillarization in that it is due to converging visions on
many political issues rather than to negotiations among political elites despite their initial
differences in principle. One could say, in somewhat exaggerated terms: compromises then,
consensus now.’ (Koole and Daalder 2002: 39).
Today, Lijphart sees consensus democracy as superior to majoritarian democracy,
regardless of whether society is segmented or not, but in his early work on
consociationalism, he explicitly warned against a ‘depoliticized’ or, in Dutch publications:
a cartel democracy: elite accommodation without social segmentation. He predicted that,
deprived of a choice within the system, citizens eventually will choose against the system
(e.g. Andeweg 2001; Lijphart 1968). As Deschouwer (2012: 10) put it, writing about
Belgium: ‘The consociational democracy has been transformed into a ‘depoliticized’ or
‘cartel’ democracy, where the practices of consociational democracy are continued in a
society that no longer needs these pacifying and protecting devices. A depoliticized
democracy is likely to be challenged, to be questioned for its lack of debate and flexibility,
for its lack of performance. Political movements criticizing the principle of consociational
power sharing, with its blatant lack of alternation in power, might find fertile ground in
old consociational democracies. (. . .) Belgium is – like Austria and the Netherlands –
another place where we can observe this type of challenge to the very heart of the system’.
Writing in the late 1960s, Lijphart expected that the radical Left would profit from this
anti-system sentiment, but in reality the populist Right has been the main beneficiary in
former consociational democracies such as Belgium and the Netherlands. In Belgium the
main party of the populist Right, Vlaams Blok, was founded in 1978 (relaunched as
Vlaams Belang in 2004) in reaction to one of the consociational pacts. In the Netherlands,
the first populist Right party, List Pim Fortuyn, was founded in 2002, in opposition to the
‘purple coalition’, a coalition of the former class enemies the Socialists and Liberals –
epitomizing consensus government. After the assassination of its leader in 2002, the party
was in disarray and eventually disbanded, but it has been replaced by Wilders’ Partij voor
de Vrijheid (PVV) and more recently also by Forum voor Democratie. The extent to which
populist Right parties are anti-system is debatable, but their core characteristic –
perceiving a distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elites – clearly defines
them as anti-consociationalist. Obviously, the success of the populist Right cannot be
attributed solely to anti-cartel sentiments. Anxiety about a multicultural dilution of the
‘pure people’ also plays an important role in both countries, with the qualification that in
Belgium Rightwing populism is much stronger in Flanders, with only a few very small
parties, such as the Front National (since 2012 Democratie Nationale) in Wallonia.
Moreover, the populist challenge is not confined to post-consociational countries, as
Lijphart points out (Bogaards 2015: 89; Lijphart 2001: 135). Nevertheless, there is a clear
correlation between consociational or consensus democracy and the strength of populist
parties (Andeweg 2001; Hakhverdian and Koops 2007).
One might object that with regard to the populist challenge Belgium is treated as a post-
consociational democracy whereas the previous section has argued that Belgium
transformed into a second phase of consociationalism. In fact, both are true, but at
different levels and with regard to different cleavages. At the federal level elite
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accommodation of the language division qualifies Belgium as a consociational system still.
Because of the split of the Belgian party system, party competition takes place only within
Flanders and within Wallonia. Within those regions no cleavage needs to be
accommodated: the class and religious cleavages are no longer salient, and the regions are
linguistically homogeneous, with Brussels as a notable exception. As a consequence,
Belgium also qualifies as a depoliticized democracy at the regional level.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Belgium and the Netherlands have adopted, at least
initially, very different strategies to deal with the populist challenge (e.g. Andeweg et al.
2008). In 1989 all other Belgian parties excluded the Vlaams Blok from government
participation, while in the Netherlands, the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF) was immediately
included into the governing coalition. The new and leaderless party proved too divided
internally to govern, the government disbanded after only 87 days, and the LPF eventually
disappeared. In 2010, the strategy of inclusion was used again to deal with the PVV. The
Rutte I government (2010-2012) included ministers from the Christian-Democratic and
conservative-liberal parties alone, but the PVV was included in the coalition, a special
coalition agreement spelled out the three-party agreement, and PVV leader Wilders joined
the intra-coalition coordination meetings. This coalition ended prematurely when the PVV
left the coalition in a disagreement over austerity measures.
In Conclusion
It is impossible to do full justice to all the nuances of the consociational experience in the
Low Countries in a short paper, but even this relatively crude comparison between the
two countries reveals a number of differences, but also some relevant similarities – relevant
in the sense that they highlight questions to consociational theory that warrant further
exploration. Table 3 summarizes the main findings of our comparison of Belgium and the
Netherlands with regard to the problem (segmentation), its solution (elite cooperation),
and the trajectory since depillarization.
If we could have compared Dutch consociationalism based on class and religious
divisions with Belgian consociationalism based on the language cleavage, we would have
been a step closer to analyzing the impact of the nature of the cleavages on elite
Table 3: Relevant Similarities and Differences Between Belgian and Dutch Consociationalism
relevant similarities differences
the problem Similar cleavages to start with Pillarization more complete and more
institutionalized in NL than in BExistence of moderating cross-pressures
at the organizational level
Pillarization came after, not before
elite cooperation
the solution Important role of citizen passivity Elite cooperation structural in NL,
intermittent in B
the
trajectory
Vulnerability to populist challenge
to depoliticized democracy
(elite cooperation without social
segmentation)
Depillarization slower and less complete
in B than in NL
Transition to new form of
consociationalism
based on language divide in B;
dealignment in NL
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cooperation. However, this was not to be. Originally, the Belgian language cleavage was a
latent conflict and the divisions in Belgian and Dutch society were quite similar. By the
time Belgian consociationalism was adapted to deal with the language division, the
original cleavages in the Netherlands were all but erased without being replaced. This is
not to say that the conflict between Dutch and French speakers in Belgium was irrelevant
between the end of World War I and the 1960s, but its main effect was an asymmetrical
and less stable pillarization as the Socialist and Christian segments were strongest in
different regions of the country.
Consociationalism is sometimes defined as a reaction to coinciding (and thus mutually
reinforcing) social cleavages, rather than cross-cutting cleavages (with the resulting cross-
pressures having a moderating effect). It has always been clear that the Christian pillar
formed an exception. It straddled the class cleavage, resulting in contacts between working
class and middle class church members. But the literature on Belgium and the Netherlands
has drawn attention to the fact that moderating cross-pressures may not only exist at the
mass level, but can also be found at the organizational level, where the leaders of Socialist
and Liberal organizations had to weigh the pros and cons of cooperation with either each
other, or with their Christian counterparts. Whether similar cross-pressures can be found
in other consociational countries and the extent to which cross-pressures at the
organizational level indeed have the presumed moderating effect are important questions
for consociational theory.
The fact that in both the Low Countries pillarization developed or at least accelerated
after, not before, the start of elite cooperation (in both countries at the end of World War
I, is of great importance for the debate about the origins of consociationalism: a ‘self-
denying prophecy’ in which prudent elites preempt a destabilization of democracy by
social divisions or an elite culture of compromise and cooperation that has its own causes
(history, absence of a majority, etc.) unrelated to social developments. It would be too
simple to interpret the evidence from the Low Countries as a falsification of the ‘self
denying prophecy’ hypothesis. Pillarization may have developed after 1918, but
pillarization is not the same thing as segmentation. To the extent that we can determine
developments in society in those years, it seems likely that the social cleavages and the
resulting segmentation of Dutch and Belgian society were already visible before the Great
Pacification and the Pact of Loppem. In Belgium more than in the Netherlands there have
been several crises (the ‘Royal Question’, the ‘Great Strike’, the ‘Education War’) that
prompted elite accommodation to prevent further escalation of the conflict. Of course, this
interpretation begs the question why pillarization developed at all. Lijphart argues that
setting up pillarized organizations was actually a strategy to prevent conflicts from
resurfacing: good fences make good neighbours: ‘It is in the nature of consociational
democracy, at least initially, to make plural societies more thoroughly plural. Its approach
is not to abolish or weaken segmental cleavages but to recognize them explicitly and to
turn the segments into constructive elements of stable democracy’ (Lijphart 1977: 42).
However, pillarization may have served another purpose as well: protecting the leadership
of a social segment against internal criticism of their accommodationist behaviour by
encapsulating the rank and file in organizations under their control. This interpretation of
pillarization as an instrument of social control clearly fits with the passivity of citizens that
has struck observers of consociationalism in both the Low Countries.
For the current political situation in both countries the finding that both are challenged
by populist parties, and my hypothesis that this is at least partially caused by continued
elite cooperation despite the disappearance of the original divisions, is of particular
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relevance. The implicit warning that if voters are denied a meaningful choice within the
system, they will vote against the system applies to all political systems, but post-
consociationalist systems seem particularly vulnerable in this respect.
Thus, this paired comparison yields several questions for a new research agenda on
consociationalism. To that agenda we may add some of the findings listed in table 3 that
still defy explanation. Why, for example, did Belgian pillars adopt a service providing or
even clientelistic function to replace the ideology that had held the pillars together
previously, or the other way around, why did Dutch pillars not avail themselves of that
alternative organizational ‘glue’ and why did the few Dutch pillar organizations that also
provided services (housing, health care) deemphasize their pillarized background and aim
to professionalize or even commercialize instead? And even more fundamentally, why was
elite accommodation in the Netherlands rather institutionalized, and a permanent fixture
of elite culture, whereas in Belgium it had the nature of ad hoc crisis resolution, with
periods of more competitive, or even majoritarian, politics in between? I rejected the
hypothesis that, other than in the Netherlands, the Belgian Christians and Socialists
enjoyed, or were very close to, a majority, as the three Dutch Christian parties that later
formed CDA had a majority throughout the period of pillarization. Perhaps the fact that
a national identity was strong in the Netherlands but weak in Belgium has played a role,
but that is merely a conjecture at this stage. All we can say on the basis of this
comparison is that very different forms of social segmentation and elite cooperation can be
found under the umbrella of consociational democracy, and that in itself is worthy of
further analysis.
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